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Abstract 
 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require the majority of directors 
of a board to be independent. However, the current definition of “independent director” remains 
vague when a director is socially connected to the top management through many links such as 
past work experience, education background, nonprofessional organizational, etc. This paper 
studies the corporate governance effect of social connections of CEOs and directors by 
comparing a group of U.S.-listed Israeli firms to their matched U.S. firms. As a result, I find 
while Israeli boards are more social connected to each other than U.S. firms, Israeli directors 
have similar degree of social connection to their CEOs as U.S. directors. I find for both Israeli 
and U.S. firms, the firms are larger when their CEOs and directors have more social connections. 
I find for U.S. firms, CEO’s compensation is higher when the CEO has more social connections, 
and when the CEO is more connected to the directors, but I didn’t find significant results for 
Israeli firms. On the contrary, for Israeli firms, I find the total compensation of all executives and 
directors is higher when the directors are more connected to their CEOs, but the results are not 
significant for U.S. firms. 
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1. Introduction 
  Many people question whether corporate board matters, but when things go wrong, the 
board is often placed in the center of criticism. Amid corporate scandals in recent years, there has 
been an increasing popularity in the study of the role of board of directors in corporate 
governance literatures. Possible answers range from boards being legal necessities to fulfill 
government regulations to boards taking active part of management and control of companies 
(Adams, Hermalin, Weisbach 2010). To study the role of boards, researches study different 
attributes of boards and try to determine if some structures have better corporate governance 
roles. Some important attributes that have been studied are board independence, board size, 
CEO-Chairman duality, staggered boards, directors’ business affiliations to the company, and 
board share ownership, among others. Besides studying attributes of boards, researches also 
study functions of boards by categorizing the functions into monitory function and advisory 
function. In the monitory function, a board is expected to involve in the firm’s corporate decision 
making process in an attempt to align the incentives of the management with the interests of the 
shareholders. In the advisory function, the board is expected to use the expertise of its members 
to counsel management in establishing corporate policies (Chen 2007). This paper adds a layer 
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of “social connection” to the definition of the independence attribute of boards and studies both 
the monitory and advisory functions of boards. 
 The current Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations require the majority 
of directors of a board to be independent, because independent directors are expected to have an 
important function in monitoring the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and other executives. 
However, the current definition of “independent director” is limited to a director who has neither 
financial nor familial ties to the CEO or the firm (Hwang, Kim, 2009). What if the board and the 
top management are socially close? The definition of “independent director” remains vague 
when it comes to directors with social connections to the CEO through many of the indirect ways 
such as they may served together on the board of directors of another company, went to school 
together, worked together in the past, have membership in a same golf club, attend business 
roundtable meetings together, or serve as trustees of a same charitable organization (Fracassi, 
Tate, 2009). Romano (2005) argues that reforms mandating increased board independence are 
window-dressing since firms can circumvent the requirements by hiring directors who satisfy the 
statutory requirements for independence, but who are somehow connected to the CEO. 
 However, by saying the definition of “independent director” is vague when adding a layer 
of “social connection” does not necessarily mean it is a bad thing. On one aspect, it might be true 
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that directors who are “independent” by definition but are somehow socially connected to the 
CEO weaken the monitory function of boards. Weakened monitory function leads to negative 
corporate governance results such as over payment of CEO’s compensation. On the other aspect, 
socially connected directors and the CEO might enhance the advisory function of boards, 
because directors might share valuable information with their CEOs through social interactions. 
Enhanced advisory function results in better performance of a company. As a result, the study of 
the role of social connection in board independence cannot be simply put as good or bad. In this 
paper, I explain different types of social connections, make hypothesizes of their potential 
corporate governance effects, and I test the hypothesizes with a unique set of hand-collected data 
of a group of U.S.-listed Israeli firms and their matched group of U.S.-listed U.S. firms in year 
2006. 
 First, I argue that companies from different country and cultural background have 
different social attributes and they have different degree of social connections even within a 
same society. Study of sociology points out that people tends to “stick with” people who are 
more like themselves. As an analogy, international students at the Ohio State University tend to 
play more with other international students, for example, Chinese play with Chinese, Indians 
play with Indians, etc. Consistent with this assumption, as a result of my analysis the boards of 
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Israeli firms are much more socially connected with boards of other Israeli companies in the 
United States than between boards of U.S. firms. 
 Second, through the first observation I noticed that Israeli boards “know” each other 
better. However, would it also be true that within each Israeli firm, the directors are more 
socially connected to their CEOs? My test result shows that Israeli directors have the same 
degree of social connections to their CEOs as U.S. directors. One explanation for this result 
might be the “bonding hypothesis”, which suggests foreign firms list in U.S. to “borrow” from 
more stringent regulations to reassure investors. (See Appendix Two for more details.) The first 
and second results together shows that the two groups of firms in this study share commonality 
while remain different. 
 Third, I study social connection as a measure of social capital of each CEO and director. 
Horton, Millo, and Serafeim (2009) suggest that individuals and firms with more social capital 
tend to be more successful in their competitive environments. I assume that more socially 
connected CEOs and boards are more powerful and their companies are larger. I take year-end 
total asset as a measure of size of companies. Consistent with the assumption, I find for both 
Israeli firms and U.S. firms the total number of CEO’s social connections and the total number of 
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all directors’ social connections is positively associated with total asset of firms, after controlling 
for total asset at the beginning of the year. 
Fourth, I study the influence of CEO’s and board’s social capital on CEO’s compensation 
and total compensation of all executives and directors. Horton, Millo, and Serafeim (2009) also 
suggest CEOs with more social capital receive more compensation. This might be explained by 
two different reasons. First, more socially connected CEOs might have more influence in 
compensation decision making. Second, more socially connected CEOs might provide better 
service because they are more socially powerful, thus they are better rewarded. Consistent with 
this assumption, I find for U.S. firms, CEO’s compensation is positively associated with CEO’s 
social capital. However, I didn’t find significant association between Israeli CEO’s 
compensation and their social capital. 
Fifth, I study the effect of social connections between directors and their CEOs on CEO’s 
compensation and total compensation of all executives and directors. The assumption is directors 
who are socially connected to the CEO might weaken their monitory function in corporate 
governance thus result in higher compensation for CEO and executives. As a result, for U.S. 
firms, I find CEO’s compensation is higher when directors are more connected to their CEOs.  
However, I didn’t find significant result for Israeli firms. On the contrary, for Israeli firms, I find 
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total compensation of all executives and directors is higher when directors are more connected to 
their CEOs. But I didn’t find significant result for U.S. firms. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literatures. 
Section 3 discusses data and methodology, Section 4 introduces hypothesis and testing results, 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
 Recent studies on board social connections and their corporate governance effect can be 
summarized into three categories: 
 The first category examines the social connections between top management, particularly 
the CEO, and directors. Chidambaran, Kedia, Prabhala (2010) find nonprofessional connections 
between the CEO and the directors elevate corporate fraud probability, while professional 
connections attenuate corporate fraud probability. Hwang and Kim (2009) find firms with boards 
that are socially connected have higher level of CEO compensation and longer CEO tenures. 
They conclude a considerable percentage of conventionally “independent” boards are 
substantively not. Fracassi and Tate (2009) find that more powerful CEOs are more likely to 
appoint directors with ties to the CEO, and that such directors trade more like the CEO in 
company stock. They also find firms with more connections between management and the board 
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make fewer internally–prompted earnings restatements and engage in more value-destroying 
acquisitions. Nguyen-Dang (2008) finds that CEOs with better external connections through 
cross-directorships are less likely to be fired following poor performance.  Kuhen (2007) finds 
evidence of reduced performance in the mutual fund industry due to preferential hiring of 
directors who are connected to the advisory firm through other funds. 
 The second category examines the social connections of CEO, top management, and 
directors to their business counterparts. Engelberg, Gao, Parsons (2009) find an additional 
connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases a CEO’s compensation by over 
$17,000 on average. Horton, Millo, Serafeim (2009) find executive’s social connections is 
positively associated with their compensation, while outside director’s social connections is 
negatively associated with their compensation. Cohen, Frazzini, Malloy (2008a) find when 
mutual fund managers share education link with a firm’s board, the managers place higher bets 
and perform better. Cohen, Frazzini, Malloy (2008b) find analyst outperform on their stock 
recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. Hochberg and Ljungqvist 
(2005) find venture capital funds whose parent firms have more influential social network have 
significantly better performance. 
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 The third category studies the interlocking social connections between two boards. Cai 
and Servilir (2009) find Merger and Acquisition between two firms whose boards are socially 
connected creates more value. Stuart and Yin (2009) find that companies, which have 
interlocking directorships with other companies that had private equity deal exposure, are 42% 
more likely to receive private equity offers.  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 U.S.-listed Israeli firms and their matched U.S. firms 
 The study of the effect of board social connection on corporate governance might have 
different results for different social communities. As an analogy, at the Ohio State University the 
Chinese student community might exhibit different academic performance from the domestic 
U.S. students. In this paper, I study the effect of board social connection by comparing two 
groups of public firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges. One group of foreign firms listed in U.S. 
and their matched group of U.S firms. An outstanding example of foreign firms listed in U.S. is 
the Israeli firms. Out of roughly 600 exchange-listed Israeli firms, as many as about 150 are 
listed on U.S. exchanges and trade only in U.S.. In this paper, we hand collected data on a list of 
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Israeli firms that were listed on U.S. exchanges in the year 2006
1
. We also collected data on 
corresponding U.S. firms that were matched to the Israeli firms by calculating and matching 
propensity scores and 2-digit SICs. (See Appendix One for more detailed information about the 
matching process.) After eliminating missing data, I was able to use data on 94 Israeli firms and 
75 U.S. firms in 2006. The number of matched U.S. firms is smaller than Israeli firms is 
justifiable because two or more Israeli firms can be matched to a same U.S. firm. 
3.2 Compensation and firm data 
 For each of the Israeli firms and matched U.S. firms, we hand-collected data from SEC 
proxy statements: Form 20-F, Form 10-K, and Form DEF-14A. We collected total compensation 
and salary plus bonus as two different measures of CEO’s compensation. We also collected total 
compensation of all executives and directors.  
 I use firm’s total asset at the end of 2006 as a measure of size of each firm. I assume that 
larger firms have more assets. I also use firm’s total asset at the beginning of 2006 to control in 
regression. The data of total asset is collected from Compustat database. 
 
                                                        
1 The data for firm characteristics is part of Prof. Anil Makhija’s research work. I was a member of a 
group of research assistants to collect the data. The year 2006 turned out to have most available data for 
firms we collected and it is before the financial crisis that started in U.S. in 2007. 
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3.3 Proxies for social connections 
To develop proxies for social connections, I use the BoardEx database, by Management 
Diagnostic Limited Company. The BoardEx database covers over 380, 000 director and 
executive profiles, mainly Europe and North America, of publicly quoted companies and major 
private entities
2. Each person’s profile includes his or her current and historical employment 
company and position, current and historical non-professional organization such as charity 
organization and clubs, education background, among other information. Most importantly, 
through that information, BoardEx constructs each person’s network. For example, BoardEx 
shows Steven Jobs overlaps with 392 other individuals, and in more detail, BoardEx shows each 
overlap with the individual’s name, organization, organization type, whether current or historic, 
and duration in years. (See Appendix Three for a print out of Steven Job’s profile.) Besides 
individual information, BoardEx also records and analyzes network of each company that it has 
in record.  
3.3.1 Social capital for CEOs and boards 
 Horton, Millo, Serafeim (2009) point out that people who are more socially connected 
have more chance of being successful. In this paper, I use the number of total social connections 
                                                        
2 http://www.boardex.com/whos_on_boardex.htm 
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of a CEO has as an indicator of social capital of the CEO. I also use summation of the number of 
social connections of all directors of a board as an indicator of social capital of the board. 
Through BoardEx I was able to collect social connection data for 94 Israeli CEOs and 655 Israeli 
directors, 75 U.S. CEOs and 499 U.S. directors. 
3.3.2 Social Connection Index 
 Point to Point (P2P) analysis in BoardEx gives detailed information about any existing 
networks between two person for 1
st
 degree connections and 2
nd
 degree connections. The 1
st
 
degree connection records an overlap if the two persons worked in a same current or historical 
organization. The 2
nd
 degree connection records an overlap if the two persons share with a third 
person that have worked in a same company, in a same non-professional organization, or have 
same education background (same education institution and same year) with both of the two 
persons. Because for most companies, the 1
st
 degree connection is limited to overlaps within the 
company, it fails to capture external social connections between the CEO and the directors. I 
collected the total number of second-degree connections as a proxy for social connections 
between the CEO and the directors. I weighted the total number of second-degree connections by 
the total number of directors on board as a measure of Social Connection Index between the 
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CEO and the directors of a firm. The same method is applied to construct Social Connection 
Index among the directors. 
directors ofnumber 
overlaps directors  toCEO degree 2nd
 = Index Connection Social directors-CEO  
directors ofnumber 
overlaps directors  todirectors degree 2nd
 = Index Connection Social directors-directors  
3.3.3 Social connections among boards 
P2P analysis in BoardEx at company level gives detailed information about any existing 
networks among all executives and directors for two firms for 1
st
 degree connections and 2
nd
 
degree connections. I use the total number of 1
st
 degree connections and total number of 2
nd
 
degree connections as measures of social connections among Israeli boards and U.S. boards. 
4. Hypothesis and Testing Results 
4.1 Hypothesis 1: Israeli firms are more socially connected to each other than U.S. firms. 
 Companies from different country and cultural background have different social 
attributes and they may have different degree of social connections even within a same society. 
Study of sociology points out that people tends to “stick with” people who are more like 
themselves. As an analogy, international students at the Ohio State University tend to play more 
with other international students, for example, Chinese play with Chinese, Indians play with 
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Indians, etc. So are Israeli firms more socially connected to each other in the United States than 
their matched U.S. firms? 
Table 1 number of connections of firms 
  Israeli firms US firms 
# of 1st Degree Connections 644 134 
Average 1st Degree Connections 7.49 1.41 
# of 2nd Degree Connections 44892 16472 
Average 2nd Degree Connections 522.00 173.39 
Number of observations 86 95 
By recording each Israeli firm’s and U.S. firm’s profiles in BoardEx and running P2P 
analysis on company level, I was able to measure the degree of social connections of the firms as 
total number of 1
st
 degree connections and total number of 2
nd
 degree connections. I divide the 
total number of connections by number of observations to get average connections. Table 1 
shows that for 86 Israeli firms there are 644 1
st
 degree connections and 44892 2
nd
 degree 
connections. In comparison, for 95 U.S. firms
3
 there are only 134 1
st
 degree connections and 
16472 2
nd
 degree connections. Israeli firms is about 5 times more connected than U.S. firms for 
1
st
 degree connections and about 3 times more connected for 2
nd
 degree connections. As a result, 
hypothesis 1 is supported by the data. 
 
                                                        
3 The number of observed U.S. firms is larger than 75 because BoardEx records two profiles for a same 
company when it is delisted from stock exchange. 
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4.2 Hypothesis 2: Israeli directors are more connected to their CEOs than U.S. directors. 
 Hypothesis 1 has shown that Israeli boards “know” each other better. However, would it 
also be true that within each Israeli company, the directors are more socially connected to their 
CEOs? I run two sample T-test on Social Connection Index between the CEO and directors for 
Israeli firms and matched U.S. firms. Table 2 shows T-test for sample different result in p-value 
of 0.808, the result fails conclude that there’s significant difference.  
Table 2 CEO-director Social Connection Index 
  Israeli firms US firms 
Mean 7.00 6.69 
Stand Deviation 6.61 9.47 
Stand Error Mean 0.68 1.1 
T-test for difference 
t-value -0.24 
p-value 0.808 
The result shows that Israeli directors have about the same degree of social connections 
to their CEOs as U.S. directors. One explanation for this result might be the “bonding 
hypothesis”, which suggests foreign firms list in U.S. to “borrow” from more stringent 
regulations to reassure investors. (See Appendix Two for more details.) If the “bonding 
hypothesis” is valid here, it shows that U.S. regulations are effective in controlling for board 
social connections to a certain level even though controlling for social connection is not included 
in the definition of board independence. 
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4.3 Hypothesis 3: Larger firms have CEOs and directors who are more socially connected. 
 Horton, Millo, and Serafeim (2009) suggest that individuals and firms with more social 
capital tend to be more successful in their competitive environments. I assume that more socially 
connected CEOs and boards are more powerful and their companies are larger. I take each firm’s 
total asset at the end of 2006 as a measure of size of companies. And I use the number of total 
social connections of a CEO as an indicator of social capital of the CEO.  
Table 3 regressing total asset on CEO’s social capital 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ceo_sinx 2371.571 -781.44** 2371.571*** 2371.571*** 8266.75*** 94.273 8266.747*** 8266.747***
(1465.288) (302.321) (294.532) (394.341) (2116.40) (85.509) (77.820) (1377.187)
ta_begin 1.806*** 1.075***
(0.039) (0.005)
resid_ta_ceo 1.806*** 1.075***
(0.039) (0.005)
resid_ta_dir_ceo 1.840*** 1.043***
(0.054) (0.105)
Number of observations 92 92 92 92 74 74 74 74
R-squared 0.03 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.17 0.99 0.99 0.66
Israeli firms US firms
 
In Table 3, first I run simple regression of total asset on CEO’s social capital. I find 
significant result for U.S. firms at 1% level, but I didn’t find significant result for Israeli firms. 
Then I use total asset at the beginning of 2006 as a control variable, the result becomes 
significant for Israeli firms, but the result for U.S. firms becomes insignificant. However, simply 
using total asset at the beginning of 2006 is not correct because CEO’s social capital might also 
be correlated with total asset at the beginning of 2006. To control for collinearly between the 
dependent variables, I regress total asset at the beginning of 2006 on CEO’s social capital and 
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take the residual. Then I use the residual as a control variable. In the end, the result becomes both 
significant for Israeli firms and U.S. firms at 1% level, suggesting that CEO’s social capital is 
positively associated with the size of firms. 
Table 4 regressing total asset on board’s social capital 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
dir_sinx_total 431.461** -223.583*** 431.461*** 493.816*** 2148.213*** 32.03* 2148.213*** 2201.045***
(198.353) (37.483) (35.337) (36.928) (256.579) (16.510) (11.833) (15.538)
ta_begin 1.853*** 1.069***
(0.035) (0.006)
resid_ta_dir 1.853*** 1.069***
(0.035) (0.006)
resid_ta_dir_ceo 1.856*** 1.069***
(0.037) (0.008)
Number of observations 92 92 92 92 74 74 74 74
R-squared 0.05 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.49 0.99 0.99 0.99
Israeli firms US firms
 
 Similarly, I use the number of total social connections of all directors of a board as an 
indicator of social capital of the board. I regress firm’s total asset at the end of 2006 on board’s 
social capital, and I use the residual from regressing total asset at the beginning of 2006 on 
board’s social capital as a control variable. As a result, I find significant results for both Israeli 
firms and U.S. firms at 1% level, suggesting board’s social capital is also positively associated 
with the powerfulness of firms. 
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4.4 Hypothesis 4: CEOs who are more socially connected receive more compensation. 
Horton, Millo, and Serafeim (2009) also suggest CEOs with more social capital receive 
more compensation. This might be explained by two different reasons. First, more socially 
connected CEOs might have more influence in compensation decision making. Second, more 
socially connected CEOs might provide better service because they are more socially powerful, 
thus they are better rewarded.  
Table 5 regressing CEO’s total compensation on CEO’s social capital 
  Israeli firms US firms 
  (1) (2) 
ceo_sinx 1157.59 2382.02** 
 (1493.15) (1069.66) 
Number of observations 56 69 
R-squared 0.02 0.07 
 
Table 6 regressing CEO’s salary plus bonus on CEO’s social capital 
  Israeli firms US firms 
  (1) (2) 
ceo_sinx 815.49 526.32** 
 (559.47) (224.02) 
Number of observations 50 69 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 
Table 5 and Table 6 shows when I regress CEO’s total compensation and salary plus 
bonus on CEO’s social capital, the result is both significant for U.S. firms at 5% level. But the 
result is insignificant for Israeli firms. The result suggests that U.S. CEOs receive more 
compensation when they are more socially connected, but it is not the case for Israeli CEOs. 
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4.5 Hypothesis 5: When directors are more socially connected to their CEOs, the CEO receives 
higher compensation and all executives and directors also receive more compensation. 
Directors who are socially connected to the CEO might weaken their monitory function 
in corporate governance and result in higher compensation for CEO and executives. The 
directors might also use the socially connection to get more compensation for themselves.  
Table 7 regressing CEO’s total compensation on CEO-director social connection index and 
director-director social connection index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
board_ceo_sinx 0.020 0.007**
(0.022) (0.003)
board_board_sinx 0.005 0.022
(0.004) (0.016)
residual_bc_bb 0.008 -0.013
(0.048) (0.038)
Number of observations 56 56 56 69 69 69
R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.00
US firmsIsraeli firms
 
Table 8 regressing CEO’s salary plus bonus on CEO-director social connection index and 
director-director social connection index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
board_ceo_sinx 0.009 0.005**
(0.019) (0.002)
board_board_sinx 0.002 0.021*
(0.003) (0.011)
residual_bc_bb 0.016 0.008
(0.039) (0.120)
Number of observations 50 50 50 69 69 69
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.00
Israeli firms US firms
 
 For the first lines in Table 7 and Table 8, I regress CEO’s total compensation and CEO’s 
salary plus bonus on CEO-director Social Connection Index. The results are significant at 5% 
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level for U.S. firms. For the second line in Table 8 I regress CEO’s salary plus bonus on director-
director Social Connection Index, I noticed the result is significant at 10% level. Would it be that 
the CEO’s salary plus bonus is higher when the board of directors are more socially connected to 
each other? Because CEOs are for most of the times also directors on boards in this study, the 
director-director social connection index has actually included the social connection between the 
directors and the CEO. In order to take the effect of social connection between the directors and 
the CEO out of the director-director Social Connection Index, I regress director-director Social 
Connection Index on CEO-director Social Connection Index, and take the residual. Then I 
regress CEO’s salary plus bonus on the residual, the result becomes insignificant. The result 
shows, for U.S. firms, the social connection between the directors and their CEO is positively 
associated with the CEO’s compensation, but not the social connection among directors. 
However, the result is not significant for Israeli firms. 
Table 9 regressing total compensation of executives and directors on CEO-director social 
index and director-director social index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
board_ceo_sinx 0.074*** 0.034
(0.020) (0.022)
board_board_sinx 0.008*** 0.007
(0.002) (0.006)
residual_bc_bb -0.007 0.051
(0.040) (0.037)
Number of observations 77 77 77 66 66 66
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.06
Israeli firms US firms
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  In Table 9, I regress total compensation of all executives and directors on CEO-director 
Social Connection Index. The result is significant at 1% level for Israeli firms, but not for U.S. 
firms. Again, when I regress total compensation of all executives and directors on the residual of 
director-director social connection index on CEO-directors social connection index, the result 
become insignificant. The result suggests that, for Israeli firms, total compensation of all 
executives and directors is higher when the directors are more socially connected to their CEO. 
However, the result is not significant for U.S. firms. 
 As a result for U.S. firms, CEO’s compensation is higher when the directors are more 
connected to their CEOs, but it is not the case for Israeli CEOs; For Israeli firms, the total 
compensation of all executives and directors is higher when the directors are more connected to 
their CEOs, but it is not the case for U.S. firms. 
5. Conclusions 
 The main goal of this paper is to study the corporate governance effect of social 
connections of CEO and directors. The current SEC definition of “independent director” remains 
vague because it fails to capture social connections among the top management and the directors 
through many links such as previous work experience, education background, and 
nonprofessional organization, etc. Because different social communities have variable social 
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connection effects, different from previous works, this paper compares the social connection 
effects between a group of U.S.-listed Israeli firms and their matched U.S. firms. As a result of 
the analysis, the two groups share some effects in common while differ in others. For both Israeli 
firms and U.S. firms, the firms are larger when the CEOs and directors have more social capital. 
For U.S. firms, CEO’s compensation is higher when the CEO has more social capital, and when 
the CEO is more connected to the directors, but it is not the case for Israeli firms. For Israeli 
firms, the total compensation of all executives and directors is higher when the directors are 
more connected to their CEOs, but it is not the case for U.S. firms. Further study should be 
emphasized on finding out why are the social connection effects differ from Israeli firms to their 
matched U.S. firms. 
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Appendix One: Matching U.S. firms to Israeli firms listed in U.S.
 4
 
Matching based on closest propensity scores (p-scores) and 2-digit SIC 
1. Step 1: Calculate p-scores for each firm in Compustat (including US-listed Israeli firms) by 
running probit regressions for each year in the time period (1996-2008). 
- Full set of covariate (firm characteristics): log of total assets (SIZE) , 2-year average sales 
growth (SGROWTH), cash  to assets (CASH/ASSETS), capital expenditure to assets 
(CAPEX/ASSETS), ppe-to-sales (PPE/SALES), ebit-to-sales (EBIT/SALES),  long-term 
debt plus current portion of long-term debt to assets (DEBT/ASSETS). 
- In the first round, run probit regressions using a full set of covariates. If p-scores are not 
estimated due to missing covariates, drop some covariates and go for the second round 
estimation, and so on, until I get p-scores for all Israeli firms. 
- More specifically, probit equation for each round is as follows: 
 First round:  
        
itititit
ititititit
ASSETSDEBTSALESEBITSALESPPE
ASSETSCAPEXASSETSCASHSGROWTHSIZEIsraelfirm




///
//
765
4321  
 Second round (1996~2005) 
                            
itititit
itititit
ASSETSDEBTSALESEBITSALESPPE
ASSETSCAPEXASSETSCASHSIZEIsraelfirm




///
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654
321  
 Second round (2006~2008) 
                            
ititit
itititit
ASSETSDEBTSALESEBIT
ASSETSCASHSGROWTHSIZEIsraelfirm



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//
/
54
321  
 Third round: 
                            ititititit SALESEBITASSETSCASHSIZEIsraelfirm   // 321  
 
2. Step 2: Within the same 2-digit SIC level, choose a US match firm with the closest p-score. 
 
 
                                                        
4 The matching process is done by Jongha Lim, doctoral candidate at the Finance Department at the 
Fisher College of Business. 
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Appendix Two: Bonding Hypothesis 
While the returns available on investments in mature developed economies may not be 
higher than those for projects in emerging markets, foreign direct investment still seems to flow 
predominantly to just the developed economies.
5
  This may be the result of poor corporate 
governance in emerging markets, which means that the high investment returns do not actually 
reach the investor.  The investors in turn take their capital to the developed economies, with their 
strong corporate governance, and settle for lower but assured returns.  This has motivated firms 
in emerging markets to list in developed economies and come under the strong corporate 
governance requirements there. By listing in the US, these firms come under the stronger 
corporate governance requirements of the US exchange, as well as US institutions such as the 
SEC. 
 
                                                        
5 “The interesting thing, of course, about international capital flows is that more than 90% of it goes to 12 
countries.  Not surprisingly… better endowed in terms of predictability and the functions of governance,” 
Remarks of James Wolfensohn, then-President, World Bank, April 3, 2002. 
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Appendix Three: Steven Job’s Profile and Social Network on BoardEx 
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Appendix Three Continued 
 
 
 
 
